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Extended Unemployment
Benefits
E

arly predictions that the current
recession would be short-lived now
appear to have been overly optimistic.
Labor markets recovered slowly
following the recession of the early
1990s, and this recession shows signs of a
similar pattern. Since September 2002,
over 41 percent of Unemployment
Insurance (UI) recipients have been
exhausting their regular UI benefits, an
all-time high. Also, in the last year, more
than 20 percent of the unemployed have
been jobless for longer than 26 weeks, the
first time this has occurred since 1994.
The problem of long-term
unemployment is serious at all times but
typically gains attention only during
recessions. Here, we discuss the ability of
the UI system to address long-term
unemployment.
Unemployment Insurance can be
viewed as a three-tiered program. The
“regular” benefits that are financed and
administered by each state constitute the
program’s first tier. The second tier of the
UI system is the permanent or “standby”
extended benefit program (standby EB),
which Congress established in 1970. The
standby EB program is intended to
activate automatically when
unemployment rises, extending the
potential duration of a worker’s benefits
by 50 percent (up to 13 weeks). The third
tier of the UI system is made up of the
“emergency” benefit extensions that
Congress has enacted in every recession
since 1958. These emergency extensions
have varied greatly in their generosity,
financing, and eligibility criteria.
How Extended Benefits Work
Standby EB, the second tier of the UI
system, is a permanent extended benefits
4

program that is intended to activate
automatically in a recession—rather than
requiring congressional discretion and
action—and is financed half-and-half by
the states and the federal government.
(Regular UI benefits are financed out of
state UI trust funds, whereas most
emergency extended benefits have been
financed out of the federal UI trust fund.)
Weekly benefits under standby EB are the
same as weekly benefits under the regular
state program.
Originally, standby EB was activated
in a given state whenever the state’s 13week average insured unemployment rate
(IUR) reached 4 percent and was at least
20 percent higher than its average in the
same period of the previous two years
(see Table 1, which summarizes this and
subsequent extended benefit triggers).
Also, it was activated nationally
whenever the 13-week average of the
national IUR reached 4 percent. However,
in 1980 and 1981, Congress enacted three
changes that made it more difficult for the
standby EB program to activate—the IUR
needed to activate EB on a state-specific
basis was increased from 4 percent to 5
percent, the trigger that had activated EB
nationally was eliminated, and the
definition of insured unemployment was
revised so as to omit EB claimants from
the calculation, reducing the IUR in times
when EB was activated.1
In addition to the standard IUR trigger,
states currently have the option of
choosing either of two alternative EB
triggers. Under the first, which has been
available since 1981, EB activates when a
state’s IUR reaches 6 percent. Under this
IUR trigger, the IUR need not exceed its
level in earlier years for EB to trigger.
Under the second alternative trigger,

which has been available since 1992, EB
activates when a state’s total
unemployment rate (TUR) reaches 6.5
percent and is at least 10 percent higher
than in either of the two previous years.
(The TUR is based on the Current
Population Survey and published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In contrast, the
IUR is based entirely on UI program
data.)
Unlike standby EB, emergency benefit
extensions are enacted by Congress on an
ad hoc basis rather than being triggered
automatically. There have been seven
such extensions, from the Temporary
Unemployment Compensation Act of
1958 through the Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation of 2002
(TEUC), which was enacted and became
effective in March 2002, when it became
evident that the labor market would not
recover quickly following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.2 The
program has extended exhaustees’
benefits in all states by 50 percent of their
regular benefit duration, up to 13 weeks.
It also has provided up to an additional 13
weeks of benefits in states where standby
EB had triggered on or the IUR was at
least 4 percent and at least 20 percent
higher than its average in the same period
of the previous two years. A total of 12
states paid these additional benefits under
TEUC at some point, although by
December 2002, only three (Alaska,
Oregon, and Washington) were doing so.
The program is financed entirely from the
federal Extended Unemployment
Compensation Account (EUCA).
The original TEUC program expired at
the end of 2002, but Congress extended it
at the beginning of 2003. As a result,
workers with remaining TEUC balances
at the end of 2002 could continue to draw
emergency extended benefits. Also, new
exhaustees of regular benefits can claim
TEUC through the last week of May 2003
and can draw TEUC benefits through the
end of August 2003. However, the TEUC
extension did not provide additional
benefits to workers who exhausted their
TEUC benefits.
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Table 1 Triggers Used to Activate Standby Extended Benefits and TEUC
Trigger
Description
4% IUR with 20% State IUR of at least 4%. Also, IUR must
increase
be at least 20% higher than its average in
the same period of the previous two years.
5% IUR with 20% State IUR of at least 4%; must be at least
increase
20% higher than its average in same
period of the previous two years.
4.5% national IUR National IUR of at least 4.5% (no increase
specified)
5% IUR
State IUR of at least 5% (no increase
specified)
6% IUR
State IUR of at least 6% (no increase
specified)
6.5% TUR with
State TUR of at least 6.5%; must also be at
10% increase
least 10% higher than in the same period
of one of the previous two years.

When in effect
EB, 8/70 to 8/81
TEUC, 3/02 to 5/03
EB, 8/81 to present

Policy Alternatives
EB, 8/70 to 8/81
EB, 1976 to 8/81
(state option)
EB, 8/81 to present
(state option)
EB, 6/92 to present
(state option)

NOTE: IUR is the insured unemployment rate; TUR is the total unemployment rate; EB is the
standby extended benefits program; TEUC is the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation program that came into effect in March 2002 and is scheduled to expire in May 2003.

Trends in Extended Benefits Payments
In the recessions of the mid 1970s and
the early 1980s, the standby EB program
was a significant source of benefits for
unemployed workers, as shown in
Figure 1. However, standby EB has
activated rarely since 1981 and was a
negligible source of benefits during both
the recession of the early 1990s and the
current recession.
In a mechanical sense, the reasons for
the demise of the standby EB program are
clear. First, as mentioned above, Congress
revised the triggers in 1981 so as to make
it more difficult for EB to activate. This
policy choice was based on the belief that
the existing triggers resulted in an EB
program with work disincentive effects
that were unacceptably high. Second,
insured unemployment rates, which are
used to trigger EB, have shown a
downward trend over the last two decades
(Vroman 2002). Even if the triggers had
not been revised in 1981, the standby EB
program would have activated less
frequently in the past 20 years than before.
Simulations we have run suggest that,
under the original standby EB trigger (4
percent IUR with a 20 percent increase),
EB would have activated in only 11 states
during 2001–2002, covering even fewer
unemployed workers and UI exhaustees
than it did during the recession of the early

duration of unemployment and the UI
exhaustion rate, both of which have
trended up over time.3 As Figure 1 shows,
the demise of standby EB has been
accompanied by the rise of emergency
federal UI extensions.

1990s (Woodbury and Vroman 2003;
Walters and Wenger 2003).
However, the demise of standby EB
has two underlying causes. First, labor
markets have been stronger since 1985
than they were between 1970 and 1985.
Second, the financing of standby EB is
shared by the states and the federal
government, whereas emergency
extensions have been federally funded.
With Congress willing to pass emergency
extensions, the states have not pressured
Congress to revise the standby EB
triggers so that the program activates
more frequently. Indeed, during 2002
governors could, and did, terminate
standby EB in states where it had
triggered on as soon as the current
emergency extension (TEUC) passed.
This shifted the financing of extended
benefits from the states to the federal
government.
One could possibly argue that the
demise of the standby EB program is an
appropriate outcome—if unemployment
has fallen secularly, then the demand for
unemployment insurance would also fall.
However, Congress has continued to pass
emergency benefit extensions in each
recession, essentially ignoring the
downward trend in the unemployment
rate and gauging the need for extended
benefits with an eye to the median

Two obvious policy options exist for
addressing long-term unemployment. The
first is to expand and/or extend the current
emergency extension (TEUC), which
provides 13 weeks of extended benefits in
most states and is set to expire in May
2003. As yet, there is little evidence of
improvement in the labor market, and
roughly half of all TEUC recipients have
exhausted their emergency benefits. This
suggests that Congress should consider
expanding TEUC to provide an additional
10 to 13 weeks of benefits to workers who
have exhausted their TEUC benefits. It
also suggests that an extension of the
existing TEUC program through the end
of 2003 may well be needed.
A second option is to revive the
standby EB program and make it a
significant source of extended benefits
during recessions. This option would
require a rethinking of both the financing
and the triggering of standby EB. How to
finance extended benefits—whether
federally or by the states—has been a
source of contention for decades
(Blaustein 1993). However, the shared
state–federal financing of standby EB has
been the downfall of standby EB, and
Congress has been willing repeatedly to
finance emergency extensions federally. It
is time for Congress to acknowledge that
the financing of benefits beyond 26 weeks
is a federal responsibility and to make the
standby EB program federally funded.
Reviving standby EB would also
require Congress to lower the IUR trigger,
lower the alternative TUR trigger and
make it mandatory rather than optional, or
adopt a new EB trigger, such as the UI
exhaustion rate. The automatic triggering
of standby EB has three advantages over
emergency extensions. First, emergency
extensions are subject to a “recognition
lag”—it takes time for Congress to
recognize the onset of a recession and to
enact legislation, so there may be a long
5
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extensions, which workers will rely on
until the labor market recovers.

Figure 1 UI Benefits, by Type, 1970–2002
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Regular benefits

Standby extended benefits

Emergency benefits

1. In addition, more stringent eligibility and disqualifying conditions were imposed on EB claimants. These changes were part of a broader effort by
the then-new Reagan administration and Congress
to reduce expenditures on domestic programs.
2. For a summary of the emergency extensions
up to TEUC, see Woodbury and Rubin (1997).
3. The UI exhaustion rate peaked at 38.2 percent
in 1975, 40.8 percent in 1983, 40.1 percent in 1993,
and 42.7 percent in 2002.
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lag between the onset of slack labor
markets and the availability of extended
benefits. Second, emergency extensions
have been politically difficult to shut
down; as a result, they may continue to
pay extended benefits beyond the time
when labor markets have recovered and
when workers can reasonably be expected
to find reemployment. Third, emergency
extensions have usually been made
effective on the date of enactment,
leaving UI administrators little or no time
to implement the new program. For all
these reasons, emergency extensions are
likely to be less efficient than automatic
extensions.
In January 2003, a third possible
option was proposed: the Bush
Administration’s Personal Reemployment
Accounts (PRAs). The PRA proposal has
three main features. First, certain UI
claimants would be identified as “likely
to exhaust” their regular benefits. Second,
for these claimants, an account of up to
$3,000 would be established to buy
intensive reemployment services,
training, and other services like
transportation or child care, at the
claimant’s discretion. Third, if the
claimant returns to work within 13 weeks
of receiving the first UI payment, he or
she would keep whatever balance
remained in the PRA. This last feature
6
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creates an incentive for rapid
reemployment and gives PRAs the flavor
of a reemployment bonus, which has been
extensively studied in randomized trials
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001).
The size of the worker-managed
account—$3,000—suggests that the PRA
is being put forward as an alternative to a
further extension of TEUC (13 weeks at
the national average weekly benefit
amount of $230 is roughly $3,000).
However, eligibility for PRAs would be
restricted to about 12 percent of new UI
recipients (President’s Council of
Economic Advisers 2003), while UI
exhaustion rates are currently in excess of
40 percent. Whatever the merits of PRAs
as a reemployment policy for workers who
are likely to benefit from reemployment
assistance and training when labor
markets are tight, PRAs cannot be viewed
as a substitute for extended benefits when
labor markets are slack.
Long-term unemployment is a problem
that is generally neglected until it
becomes acute, as it does in recessions.
The PRA is a proposal that has the
potential to help long-term unemployed
workers throughout the business cycle
and to shorten their unemployment spells.
However, it should not be confused with
short-term measures like benefit
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